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The Borders Within: Mobility and Enclosure in the Riau Islands1 
Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons 
Abstract 
The border studies literature makes a strong case against claims for unfettered 
transnationalism and ‘borderlessness’ in our ‘globalising world’. However, its focus on 
movement across borders means that it fails to address bordering practices that occur within 
the nation-state as a result of transnational activity. In this paper, we extend Cunningham and 
Heyman’s concepts ‘enclosure’ and ‘mobility’ to confront the different layers of bordering 
(both physical and nonphysical) that have occurred in Indonesia’s Riau Islands since they 
became part of the Indonesia– Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle. 
Keywords: borderlands, enclosure, Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-
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The creation of the Indonesia–Malaysia– Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) in 1990 is 
often cited as an example of an increasingly ‘borderless’ world in which people, goods and 
information flow seamlessly across national borders (Ohmae 1990, 1995). The IMS-GT, as 
an example of the way market linkages and investment flows transcend political boundaries, 
is said to typify Ohmae’s concept of ‘region states’ that are able to overcome the restrictions 
of national sovereignty. Scholars working within the fields of border studies, migration 
studies and transnationalism are increasingly critical of Ohmae’s post-nationalist claims. 
Arguing that nation-states continue to play powerful roles in territorialising global order, they 
point to the significant role of ‘bordering practices’ in shaping the experiences of different 
groups of national subjects as they seek to move across geopolitical boundaries (Van Houtum 
and Van Naerssen, 2002; Cunningham, 2004). In studies of the Singapore– Indonesian 
component of the IMS-GT that centres on the Riau Islands of Batam and Bintan, this 
attention to the unevenness of transnational flows has focused primarily on the ease with 
which Singaporeans, along with Singaporean capital, flow freely into Indonesian territory, 
and the difficulties that Riau Islanders face when attempting to move in the opposite direction 
(Peachey et al., 1998; Lindquist, 2002: 18; Sparke et al., 2004). These accounts take as the 
object of their analysis the material and symbolic practices of (b)ordering and control 
exercised by Singaporean and Indonesian immigration and customs officials, other 
government bodies and naval patrols. While these studies also begin to examine the multiple 
ways in which the IMS-GT supports and inhibits other forms of movement within and along 
the Singapore–Indonesia border, important distinctions between the realities of different local 
communities are often lost in a literature that concentrates primarily on the island of Batam 
and generally either ignores local communities elsewhere in the Riau Islands or otherwise 
aggregates their experiences with those of Batam Islanders (see Grundy-Warr et al., 1999; 
Mack, 2004; Sparke et al., 2004). 
As Wee and Chou (1997: 533) observe, the IMS-GT can be understood as a series of 
‘multiple realities’: the realities of development planners in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and 
Singapore; the reality of the IMS-GT as a self-contained economic area; and the realities of 
local communities in Riau. This paper provides a more nuanced understanding of the lives of 
the people who occupy the Riau borderlands by shifting our analysis away from the fixed line 
that represents the geopolitical boundary between Singapore and Indonesia, and focusing 
instead on the boundaries that define the multiple spaces that constitute the border zone. 
Drawing on the significant insights that previous studies of the IMS-GT have made regarding 
differential mobilities across the border, we expand our analysis to include a local-level study 
of the ways in which a community living within the border has responded to the growth 
triangle. In particular, we focus on those people who do not cross international borders, but 
whose lives are increasingly shaped by national and subnational bordering processes. 
Through our examination of the subjective experiences of people living in Tanjung Pinang, 
the main town on Bintan Island, we seek to re-introduce an awareness of distinctions within 
the borderlands in order to better understand the complex and nuanced practices of bordering 
within the IMS-GT.2 
Finding a vocabulary  
The paper is, like all anthropology of the borders, an analysis of the ‘narrative of 
borderlanders’ (Horstmann, 2004: 7), in this case the narratives of Indonesians living in the 
town of Tanjung Pinang.3 In our analysis of Bintan Islanders’ experiences of the IMS-GT, we 
draw on Cunningham and Heyman’s (2004) explication of cross-border interactions. While 
Cunningham and Heyman recognise borderlanders’ potential to disrupt practices of state and 
nation, they reject celebratory accounts of border crossings that overemphasise the 
importance of those crossings as a symbol of post-modern deterritorialisation of identity and 
geography, arguing instead for a more textured understanding of bordering processes 
(Cunningham and Heyman, 2004: 289–293). In their attempt to re-centre debates on the 
nature of borders, Cunningham and Heyman identify mobility and enclosure as two points on 
a continuum of movement. They argue that mobility is only one way in which movement is 
produced and experienced. As they describe it, enclosure is the inverse of mobility: whereas 
mobility refers to ‘social processes that enable and induce’ the movement of ‘specific goods, 
people and ideas’, enclosure refers to the social processes that ‘delimit and restrict’ that 
movement (Cunningham and Heyman, 2004: 293–294). In a similar vein, Shamir (2005: 199) 
writes of a ‘global mobility regime, oriented to closure and the blocking of access’. 
By introducing the concept of enclosure to the discussion of differential mobilities, 
Cunningham and Heyman create a ‘framework of movement’ that can be used to explore the 
different impact that borders have on the communities they seek to hold together or keep 
apart. The idea of enclosure (as opposed to immobility) ‘usefully transforms the assumption 
that people and things have homes, locations, or places into an open question about how sets 
of people and things and their “proper” locations are defined, internalized and enforced’, thus 
allowing us to understand borders as sites where movement is structured by ongoing social 
processes that permit, monitor or halt movement (Cunningham and Heyman, 2004: 293).4 By 
using the concepts of enclosure and mobility to explore the differential social processes 
through which borders are constructed, we are able to better understand the impact of 
Singapore’s proximity on life in the Riau Islands. These concepts provide us with a 
vocabulary with which to more closely examine the impact of changing political imperatives 
and shifts in the balance of economic and cultural capital along the border. More importantly, 
when applied to bordering practices within the boundaries of the Indonesian state, they allow 
us to better differentiate between the experiences of different communities in the Riau 
Islands. 
The history of the relationship between the Riau Islands and Singapore before and under the 
IMS-GT is a story of the expansion and contraction of access across borders, which 
incorporates elements of both mobility and enclosure. More importantly perhaps it is a story 
of how, under the IMS-GT, the increased influence of Singapore in the Indonesian 
borderlands has created physical and symbolic barriers to mobility within Indonesia’s 
national boundaries. In the following sections we explore how, despite the promises of 
integration and freedom of movement, the lives of people living in Tanjung Pinang have 
come to be defined more by enclosure than mobility under the IMS-GT. 
Echoes of the Zaman Dollar5  
It is important to remember in the context of studies of the IMS-GT that the border between 
Singapore and Insular Riau is relatively new. In pre-colonial times, trade routes operating 
throughout the Malay Archipelago acted as conduits for the movement of people and goods 
and facilitated the creation of strong social, cultural and economic ties among different 
communities. Insular Riau became the capital of the Johor Sultanate in the early 1700s and 
was the main entrepôt in the region for most of that century.6 Throughout this period large 
numbers of migrants, including Bugis traders and warriors, as well as Chinese, moved into 
the region. Increasing competition between the Dutch and English in South-East Asia finally 
saw the British focus their attention on Singapore. With the Anglo Dutch Treaty of London 
(1824), two artificial boundaries were created between the Dutch East Indies and the British 
Straits Settlements. The treaty effectively created a split in the Johor–Riau Sultanate and 
changed the regional political dynamics of the region (Trocki, 1979). 
Since that time Singapore has transformed itself from a nineteenth century backwater to the 
dominant politico-economic power in the region through a series of historical accidents – or 
through what Wee and Chou refer to as ‘particular processes of economic and political 
structuration’ (Wee and Chou, 1997: 530). As a result of these processes, the Riau Islands 
have become increasingly tied to the Singapore economy (Trocki, 1990). Lindquist (2002: 
52) states that using powerful Chinese networks and ‘an indigenous state model, based on a 
powerful center and unclear borders, allowed Singapore to transgress the territorial 
limitations created by the border and bind the whole Riau Archipelago to its markets’. After 
Singapore became part of the British sphere of influence, the Singapore–Insular Riau 
borderlands were transformed into a traditional South-East Asian borderland region,7 where 
people of common ethnic backgrounds (Malay and Straits Chinese) moved easily across a 
nominal geopolitical divide. Almost everyone we spoke to in Tanjung Pinang emphasised the 
‘shared history’ of Singapore and Riau and the ‘familial relationships’ between Singaporeans 
and Riau Islanders.8 In addition to its social and cultural aspects, this shared history had a 
strong economic element. This economic relationship continued long after Tanjung Pinang 
ceased to be the dominant economic power in the region: until 1963, the economy of the Riau 
Islands in general, and Tanjung Pinang in particular, was far more closely integrated with 
Singapore than it was with the rest of Indonesia (see Wee, 1985; also Lindquist, 2002). 
Indeed, it was not until the early 1960s that concepts of citizenship and nationality became 
more closely linked to notions of sovereign territory and boundary maintenance centred on 
the nation-states of Indonesia and Singapore. However, for the people of Tanjung Pinang, 
freedom of movement continued long after the formal border dividing them from Singapore 
was established. Hamzah, a 62-year-old Bugis fisher who has been in the islands since 1957, 
recalls: 
In the 1960s I remember going to Singapore with my brother-in-law. We went on 
a little boat with an outboard motor. It was only 4 horsepower. We took dried 
coconut, or sometimes fish to trade in Singapore. It was great. We weren’t well 
off, but we could afford to buy whatever we needed there – rice, sugar, sometimes 
clothes. (Interview, July 2005) 
Younger people in Tanjung Pinang also share communal memories about the time before 
1963. Abdullah, a 38-year-old civil servant, recalls: 
I remember my parents saying that before the Confrontation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia life in the islands was measured in dollars, and everyone – be they 
farmers or civil servants – was really well off. Imagine! According to the stories 
of the old people in Tanjung Pinang, they’d go to Singapore just to clean their 
jackets, just to buy rice!9 We can only imagine how well off Tanjung Pinang 
people were then. Their relationship with Singapore was so close that they’d do 
their shopping in Singapore! Now it’s the reverse. Singaporeans come to 
Indonesia to shop. (Interview, July 2005) 
As Abdullah suggests, with the onset of Confrontation Tanjung Pinang people’s access to 
Singapore changed drastically. Movement across the Straits was restricted and Riau Islanders 
found themselves enclosed by the newly imposed national border. Currency provides a useful 
metaphor for the impact that its enclosure had on changes in the relationship not only 
between Singapore and the Riau Islands, but between the Riau Islands and the Sumatran 
mainland in the period during and after Confrontation: 
Kepri10 is closer to Singapore [than to mainland Sumatra] so trading focused on 
Singapore. The Islands were flooded by Singaporean goods, and even the currency 
was Singapore dollars. Because of this many people from other parts of Indonesia 
came to Kepri. That’s why the population here is so mixed. But when 
Confrontation occurred with Malaya, there the flow of goods stopped not only 
from Malaya but from Singapore. With the coming of the Rupiah, the fortunes of 
the islands fell, and Mainland Riau began to dominate because it could export its 
primary products. (Interview, June 2002) 
As Hamzah remembers it:  
During Confrontation it became really hard to get to and from the islands, so it 
was very difficult to keep our relationships with Singapore going. As a result, we 
really suffered economically. It was very difficult to get even basic necessities. 
Sometimes we’d have the money to buy food, and there’d simply be none to buy. 
(Interview, July 2005) 
Hamzah’s recollections of the difficulties of life during Confrontation were shared by other 
older people in Tanjung Pinang. According to Rizki, a 65-year-old retired civil servant, 
‘Things became hard during Confrontation. People in the islands did it tough because all their 
overseas connections were cut. The only thing people could do was to become involved in 
smuggling’ (Interview, July 2005). 
In the stories that circulate about ‘life before Confrontation’, movement across the Straits is 
presented both as an a priori way of life and a marker of economic advantage. Residents of 
Tanjung Pinang crossed over into Singapore because they could (they possessed the means to 
purchase goods and services in Singapore) and because they always had (Singapore and 
Bintan were part of the same historical maritime economy). In these accounts, Confrontation, 
rather than Indonesian Independence, is pivotal in marking the new ‘national’ (unnatural) 
border between Indonesia and Malaya/Singapore. The new border, by enclosing sovereign 
territory, not only restricted movement within the Straits, but also made people on either side 
of the border into national citizens. Confrontation is thus pivotal in re-imagining and re-
constructing the borders between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.11 
As Rizki suggests, however, nation-building and the creation of national citizens was an 
incomplete process. While mobility contracted during and after Confrontation, smuggling 
between Bintan and Singapore was evidence that the process of enclosure was incomplete. As 
relations between Indonesia and the newly independent nations of Malaysia and Singapore 
began to normalise, ethnic Chinese and Malays resumed their movements back and forth 
across the Straits. By the late 1970s this traffic had been largely re-established – although the 
process of border-crossing had become more formalised. As Rizki remembers it: 
From 1978, things improved. The relationship was restored, then Tanjung Pinang 
people could go to Singapore with a passport and Singaporeans could come here 
with a passport. People started to move a lot more again. (Interview, July 2005) 
Restored mobility brought with it a return of prosperity to the islands. As Zainuddin, a 40- 
year-old petty trader, commented, ‘By the late 1970s, Tanjung Pinang’s economy was pretty 
good, and we all lived quite comfortably. There was a really good feeling of community, 
then. Everything was safe and peaceful’ (Interview, July 2005). Although by this time the 
rupiah had long been the official currency of the islands, a large proportion of economic 
transactions in Tanjung Pinang were again being conducted in dollars. Despite the official 
imposition of duties on goods flowing in and out of the islands, in the 1970s and 1980s 
Tanjung Pinang’s access to cheap products from Singapore was maintained through its 
flourishing culture of smuggling. For many residents of Tanjung Pinang the national border 
figured little in their everyday interactions across the Straits. While passports were normally 
required for individuals passing through immigration checkpoints, most traders continued to 
operate as they had before the border was regulated. Tanjung Pinang’s economy was strong 
and there were few remarkable differences between life in Singapore and life in the islands.12 
By the late 1980s, however, as Singapore’s industrialisation drive matured, life in Tanjung 
Pinang and Singapore had become less and less alike. While the islanders continued to 
benefit from their close proximity to the ‘Asian tiger’, economic and social development did 
not keep up with the pace of change in Singapore. Physical movement across the border by 
traders and smugglers continued as it had for decades, but the border itself began to play a 
much stronger symbolic role in marking out the differences between a developing Singapore 
and a backward Indonesia. Our respondents indicated that for the first time since 
Confrontation, the border began to represent a barrier – not because it restricted physical 
movement but because growing economic disparities began to disrupt their dreams and 
expectations about a shared ‘way of life’ across the Straits. 
The IMS-GT promised to restore those dreams. As the cost of local labour rose in Singapore, 
Indonesia’s low-skilled workforce began to attract the interest of Singapore’s private and 
government-linked companies. The IMS-GT was one element of a regionalisation strategy 
aimed at reducing Singapore’s reliance on foreign investment and overseas markets, and 
making the economy more resilient in times of recession (Yeung, 1998). By relocating 
Singapore’s low-end manufacturing industries offshore, the government sought to expand its 
economic and security borders into the region. The underpinning philosophy of the IMS-GT 
was economic complementarity in which Singaporean capital would be combined with 
Indonesian and Malaysian labour and land to facilitate cross-border regional growth (Sparke 
et al., 2004). As a direct result of the growth triangle initiative, industrial manufacturing 
zones and tourism projects were established on Batam and Bintan.13 
Despite rapid economic development, however, the promise that the IMS-GT would 
transform Insular Riau into the image of Singapore has not been fulfilled. On Batam, many 
factories and housing complexes lie abandoned, and the hotels cater predominantly to the sex 
tourism industry. On Bintan, a small manufacturing sector provides limited jobs for locals 
and the large tourism enclave remits little income to the local government or its people. 
Grundy-Warr et al. (1999) argue that the failure to ‘fast-track’ development in Batam and 
Bintan demonstrates unwillingness on the part of the Singaporean and Indonesian 
governments to achieve a functionally integrated cross-border economy. Yet despite the 
limitations of the IMS-GT, our respondents perceived the 1990s as another time of prosperity 
– prosperity that was again measured most concretely by the exchange rate. In a statement 
highly reminiscent of the discourse around the Zaman Dollar, Ilham used the currency as the 
basis for his periodisation of the decade: 
There were two phases in the 1990s. There was before the crisis and after the 
crisis. Before the crisis, Tanjung Pinang’s economy was good, and people’s basic 
needs were more than met. But after the crisis, when Singapore used dollars and 
Tanjung Pinang used rupiah, the difference was enormous. As a result the prices 
of basic goods have risen time and time again. People in Tanjung Pinang can no 
longer afford to buy anything. (Interview, July 2005) 
As Ilham’s comments suggest, the stability of the exchange rate before and after the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997–98 again became a barometer both for islanders’ welfare and for the 
health of their relationship with Singapore. As Rini observed, ‘Because we’re on the border 
with Singapore, the exchange rate is a real issue. Now that the dollar is so much higher than 
the rupiah, everything in the market has gone up’ (Interview, July 2005). Her observations 
were corroborated by Abdullah, who commented that: 
In Indonesia, but especially in Tanjung Pinang, we’re enormously sensitive to the 
value of the dollar.14 In the 1990s, Tanjung Pinang was stable, because we 
measured everything in dollars. In the 1990s the exchange rate was quite low . . . 
one dollar was worth about a thousand or at most two thousand. Now it’s almost 
six thousand. How many percent is that? The collapse of the rupiah in 1997 had an 
enormous effect on everyone, but especially on the lower and middle classes. 
Prices skyrocketed, and inflation was very high. This affected us not only 
economically, but socially. So many people have suffered. Kids had to drop out of 
school because their parents couldn’t afford to pay, and many people couldn’t 
even afford the basics anymore because everything became so expensive. Our 
wages were nothing in comparison to the prices of even the most basic necessities. 
In the 1990s everything was great in Tanjung Pinang. Life wasn’t like it is now, 
when we’re really crying out (betul-betul menjerit). (Interview, July 2005) 
The Asian Financial Crisis reduced the value of Singapore’s economic investment in Riau, 
thus threatening its economic growth. More significantly, it also brought home the broader 
implications that economic downturn in Indonesia would have on Singapore’s physical 
security. Free access to Singapore was one of the benefits offered to the citizens of Riau 
under the IMS-GT,15 but the Crisis exposed the significant inequalities between the rights of 
Singaporeans and Indonesians to cross the border. 
In 1998 as a result of the Crisis, Singapore witnessed an unprecedented growth in the 
numbers of arrests of illegal immigrants entering Singapore via the Riau Islands. The illegal 
entrants were mostly young and middle-aged men (The Straits Times, 1998). The authorities 
identified Batam and Tanjung Pinang as major hubs for people smuggling syndicates who 
operated throughout Indonesia. In an effort to crack down on illegal migration, the 
Singaporean government stepped up its coastal surveillance, as well as heightening 
immigration controls at the major checkpoints in the ferry terminals that serviced arrivals 
from the Riau Islands. Lindquist (2002: 8) in his study of life on Batam during and after the 
Crisis reports that demand for uang tunjuk (show money) increased as Singaporean 
immigration officials increasingly required Indonesian tourists to demonstrate that they had 
the means to spend time in Singapore. To spread news of its harsh treatment of illegal 
entrants, the Immigration Department started showing videos to passengers departing for 
Batam and Bintan at the World Trade Centre and Tanah Merah Ferry Terminals warning 
about tough immigration laws for illegal workers. The video showed illegal migrants being 
arrested at worksites and flats. Indonesians passing through the terminals were encouraged to 
tell their compatriots ‘back home’ about the government crackdowns on ‘illegals’.16 
Since September 11, movement across the borders has been even more tightly controlled. At 
the Tanah Merah Ferry Terminal, through which most Bintan Islanders pass into Singapore, it 
takes working-class and lowermiddle-class Indonesian citizens many times longer than other 
foreigners to pass through immigration. Their documents are carefully scrutinised, and they 
are often interrogated at length about their reasons for wanting to enter Singapore. These 
recent security concerns have also focused on the inter-linked issues of terrorism and piracy. 
The Singapore government has expressed concerns that ‘regional terror groups like the 
Jemaah Islamiah might use the strait as a launching pad to hit ports with a devastating 
“floating bomb” ’ (Vijayan, 2004). In 2004, an effort to address these issues, the Indonesian, 
Malaysian and Singaporean governments launched a joint defence initiative to patrol the 
Strait. While smuggling of goods and people has been a particular focus of the crackdown, 
local islanders travelling within the Straits have also come under increased scrutiny as a result 
of these exercises. The growth triangle promised to improve the ease of movement between 
the Riau Islands and Singapore, but the Financial Crisis and heightened concerns about 
terrorism have seen the border become much more fixed and impermeable from the 
Indonesian side. Border patrols and increased scrutiny of Indonesians at immigration 
checkpoints work to keep Riau Islanders out of Singapore, closing them off from their 
families and restricting access to trading networks. As Abdullah indicated, however, for 
Singaporeans the border remained open and the Financial Crisis in fact facilitated their ease 
of movement. 
Bordering practices are not only enacted at immigration and customs points. For the majority 
of Tanjung Pinang residents, such practices occur even before they reach the international 
border. Opportunities to cross the border have contracted not only because the Singapore 
government has tightened its immigration controls but because of the dramatic change in the 
exchange rate, and the ever-widening gap in lifestyle makes travel unaffordable.17 Although 
many Bintan Islanders have no desire to visit Singapore, respondents who do wish to cross 
the border indicated that they feel that there are no longer the same opportunities to do so. For 
Rizal, who has never been to Singapore, the drop in the value of the rupiah means his desire 
to do so is unattainable: 
I’d really like to go to Singapore to see my mother’s family, but I’d need a lot of 
money to make the trip because our money isn’t worth anything. If I took my 
money to Singapore, I couldn’t do anything. But I’d still like to go there. 
(Interview, July 2005) 
Even those who have been to Singapore in the past are unsure whether they will ever be able 
to travel there again. For Bahruddin, who once ‘went to Singapore because [he] wanted to 
really experience what [he’d] seen on TV’, a second visit is unlikely: 
It’s much harder now. It’s okay for Singaporeans because their economy is much 
better than ours, but it’s really difficult for Indonesians, especially people from 
Tanjung Pinang, to go to Singapore because the exchange rate is so bad. So even 
if we really want to go to Singapore now, we simply can’t. (Interview, July 2005) 
For Rizal and Bahruddin, economic downturn coupled with increasing border security further 
entrenches the processes of enclosure. This increasing enclosure was felt keenly by many of 
our respondents, regardless of whether they personally have a desire to visit Singapore. These 
processes are qualitatively different from the past. While Tanjung Pinang has always been 
sensitive to the dollar economy, the growing strength of the Singaporean currency and 
Bintan’s almost complete incorporation into the rupiah-based national economy have made 
the economic border more tangible. 
In contrast, for Singaporeans, who have always occupied the dominant position in the IMS-
GT, the economic crisis simply shored up that dominance. The dramatic fall in relative cost 
of goods and services obtained in the Riau Islands meant that Singaporeans’ capacity to move 
in and out of the islands actually increased.18 Our respondents are acutely aware of the 
implications of this disparity: 
The crisis was no problem for Singaporeans. They are better off because the 
exchange rate is better for them. Even if they come to Tanjung Pinang with only a 
few dollars, they can go shopping, stay in a flash hotel, and enjoy luxurious 
facilities. (Interview with Abdullah, July 2005) 
In other words, as Ilham remarked, ‘The crisis has had exactly the opposite effect on 
Singaporeans. Their purchasing power just keeps growing, so now they can buy anything 
they want’ (Interview, July 2005). 
Our respondents suggest that nowadays Bintan Islanders see themselves as qualitatively 
different from Singaporeans. They argue that in the past, Riau’s maritime economy facilitated 
ease of movement between Bintan and Singapore and forged a stronger sense of shared 
history and identity.19 Communities on both islands were linked by familial relations and 
commercial transactions. Mobility between Tanjung Pinang and Singapore was a key element 
in Bintan’s economic prosperity and its people’s well-being. During the 1960s–70s, acts of 
nation-building (such as Confrontation and the need for passports) provided unwelcome 
short-term interruptions to the Riau Islands ‘way of life’. The IMS-GT promised to 
strengthen and build on these historical ties by undermining the artificial national borders that 
divided the Straits. However, growing economic disparity and hardening borders have 
become the reality of the growth triangle. While many older Riau Islanders that we spoke to 
continue to harbour nostalgic memories about the ease of movement of people and goods 
between Bintan and Singapore, most of the younger people we interviewed see the IMS-GT 
as one part of a larger process that seeks to inscribe their place within the Indonesian nation. 
As Tanjung Pinang has been increasingly drawn into the national economy, and as the border 
between Singapore and Indonesia becomes less permeable, its residents’ identities as national 
citizens (Indonesians) replace more fluid constructions of identity based on place and 
location. The national education system (Faucher, 2004) and the national media have played 
a significant role in the making of these new national citizens. The increasing presence of 
‘cashed-up’ Singaporeans in the islands further acts to demarcate these boundaries. The 
qualitative differences between Singaporeans and local Islanders also works to undermine the 
myth of a shared past and common regional identity shared by communities in the Straits.20 
The international border thus marks not only a geopolitical division between states, but 
divides the ‘first’ world from the ‘third’ world; ‘modernity’ from ‘backwardness’; and the 
‘haves’ from the ‘have nots’. 
Internal borders  
The bordering practices associated with the growth triangle do not simply begin and end 
along the edges of the Singapore–Indonesia border. The nature of development under the 
IMS-GT has meant that such practices have been replicated within the Riau Islands as well. 
In short, the IMS-GT has not only worked to strengthen the meaning and significance of the 
international border, it has had the effect of creating multiple internal boundaries within the 
border zone. Residents of Tanjung Pinang have found that their opportunities for movement 
within and between the Riau Islands have been impacted by development policies initiated 
‘elsewhere’ – in Singapore, Jakarta and/or Batam. These policies, and the boundaries they 
create, further cement the processes of enclosure that characterise Tanjung Pinang’s 
experience of the growth triangle. In this section we examine the ways in which residents of 
Bintan Island have become defined, and their locations enforced, through different 
development programmes initiated as part of the IMS-GT. This analysis brings into sharp 
relief the multiple realities of the growth triangle, and the different circumstances of 
communities living throughout the Riau Archipelago. 
People living in Tanjung Pinang and Batam have had a very different experience of the IMS-
GT because of their history and the nature of their communities, and because of the uneven 
impact of the IMS-GT itself. Whereas Batam was essentially uninhabited except for a few 
fishing villages and farming communities, Tanjung Pinang has a long history as an important 
centre for trading and administration. Pulau Penyengat, an island in the bay of Tanjung 
Pinang, was the centre of an important pre-colonial dynasty. Tanjung Pinang was also the 
capital of the Dutch Residency of Riau and its Dependencies from 1911, and later the 
administrative centre from which the Dutch controlled a considerable section of the East 
Sumatran coastline (Wee and Chou, 1997). Although Tanjung Pinang was ruled from 
Singapore during the Japanese occupation, and became part of the province of Central 
Sumatra after Independence, its status was briefly renewed when it became the capital of the 
newly formed Riau province in 1958. The provincial capital was moved to Pekanbaru on the 
Sumatran mainland in the early 1960s, but Tanjung Pinang remained the main administrative 
centre in Insular Riau throughout the remainder of second half of the twentieth century.21 
Because Batam presented the Indonesian state and its Singaporean counterparts with an 
essentially blank canvas, it is not surprising that the growth triangle initiative primarily 
focused on facilitating Singapore’s direct foreign investment there. Under the stewardship of 
the Jakarta-controlled Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), Batam underwent a 
dramatic transformation, which included the development of large-scale industrial parks, 
tourist resorts and administrative infrastructure. In contrast to Batam, where BIDA’s Master 
Plan encompassed the entire island, in Bintan the smaller-scale manufacturing and tourism 
projects that have been developed under the banner of the IMS-GT are effectively 
quarantined from the existing population centres on the island. Batam’s tax-free status also 
meant that goods could not legally flow from Batam to other parts of Indonesia, thus 
reinforcing the boundaries between Batam and other Riau Islands. At various times since the 
establishment of the IMS-GT, the Indonesian government has attempted to regulate the flow 
of people from other parts of Indonesia into Batam – sometimes even from neighbouring 
islands such as Bintan (see Lindquist, 2002). Tanjung Pinang residents who travel to Batam 
in search of work in the factory zones have found themselves disadvantaged by a system of 
recruitment that operates on networks based in Java and the Sumatran mainland, resulting in 
lesser access to jobs for local Islanders as well as poorer wages and conditions.22 These 
practices restrict their access to economic opportunities and compound the processes of 
enclosure that restrict their movements within the Straits. 
In our many interactions with people living in Tanjung Pinang, we were left with the 
impression that people keenly feel the difference between the level of development in Batam 
and Bintan, which they blame primarily on Batam’s closer proximity to Singapore. 
According to Ghazali, a young Malay who works in the tourist industry, the problem is that: 
We’ve always lagged behind Batam. Singaporeans can go back and forward to 
Batam in a single day, but Tanjung Pinang is just that bit too far. You can see 
Batam from Singapore, and it’s very close. It takes longer to get to Tanjung 
Pinang. (Interview, July 2005) 
Yet despite their peripheral location in the IMS-GT, at first our respondents were optimistic 
about the benefits it could bring. As a long-term resident who originally came from the gas-
rich island of Natuna commented, ‘We really hoped that Sijori23 would become a locomotive 
that would drive us to realise the full potential of the islands. We’re in such a strategic 
geographic position here, on the border with Singapore and Malaysia’ (Interview, July 2005). 
Many of the people we spoke to in Tanjung Pinang also saw the formation of the IMS-GT as 
a long-overdue gesture of recognition from Indonesia’s central government in Jakarta. As 
Bahruddin, a 46-year-old civil servant, noted, ‘before Sijori, the New Order took no notice of 
Kepri, but things started to change with the signing of the agreement with Singapore’ 
(Interview, July 2005). This view that Indonesia’s involvement in the growth triangle was a 
sign of the central government’s desire to develop the economy was shared by other local 
civil servants. They had a strong expectation that under the IMS-GT Tanjung Pinang would 
become a prosperous industrial area. 
However, the ‘realities’ of the IMS-GT soon became obvious. Although most people we 
spoke to recognised that the IMS-GT brought a number of major development projects to 
Insular Riau, the majority did not feel they had benefited directly from those projects. 
Abdullah and Bahruddin, the two civil servants, saw the problem as one of access and 
distribution rather than a total failure of the IMS-GT initiatives. According to Abdullah: 
We hoped that the promise of Sijori would be realised, become reality. We hoped 
that the economic situation would improve in Tanjung Pinang, but really only a 
tiny proportion of the investment has come to Bintan in areas like Lobam 
[industrial estate] and Lagoi [the tourist area on the north of Bintan Island]. We’ve 
gotten some benefit from that – it’s increased our foreign earnings, which means 
we have more money to encourage local development – but not as much as we’d 
hoped. (Interview July, 2005) 
Bahruddin was even more damning in his critique of the IMS-GT: 
After the Sijori agreement was signed, Lagoi and Lobam were developed. The 
trouble is none of this has helped us. The goods made in Lobam go straight to 
Singapore, and not many locals are employed there. And we can’t really access 
the facilities at Lagoi – they’re designed especially for overseas tourists. Besides 
the cost, there are rules about who can go in. So I don’t really see what we’ve 
gotten out of it all. (Interview, July 2005) 
The bonded zone of Lobam is located a long distance away from the town of Tanjung Pinang. 
The zone’s protected tax status is maintained by strict control of entry and exit points. By 
land, Lobam is accessible by one narrow road at the end of which is a security gate and 
perimeter fence. Goods and commodities enter and leave the bonded zone through a special 
shipping terminal that provides a direct route to and from Singapore. Unfinished products 
arrive by ship from Singapore and are then processed by cheap Indonesian labour before 
being returned to Singapore for international distribution. Few residents of Bintan Island have 
found employment in the industrial zone. Like many bonded factory zones throughout South-
East Asia, its workforce is largely comprised of young, single women who live on-site in 
dormitory style housing. The women are mostly recruited from other parts of the Indonesian 
archipelago on short-term contracts. For Bintan Islanders, Lobam is a ‘space apart’. Its 
workforce is transient and has few ties to the local community, and its manufacturing output 
has little impact on the local economy. A flagship of Bintan’s involvement in the IMS-GT, in 
reality it is a symbol of the extent to which Bintan Islanders have been ‘left behind’ by the 
growth triangle. Its status as a tax-free zone also represents the encroachment of Singapore’s 
economic border into Indonesia and the increasing ‘fixedness’ of Bintan Islanders on the 
‘outer limits’ of economic development policy. 
The tourist enclave at Lagoi is an even more dramatic example of the ways in which Bintan 
Islanders have been excluded by the economic boundaries of the IMS-GT. Lagoi is a gated 
community occupying 23 000 hectares, or approximately one-third of the size of Singapore. 
Leased to the Bintan Resort Development Corporation (BRDC) in 1990, the resort zone 
contains hotel complexes owned largely by Singaporean interests. Tourists enter the resort 
zone through a ferry terminal owned and operated by the BRDC and accessible only to ferries 
operating from the Tanah Merah Terminal in Singapore. Inter-island ferry travel from within 
Indonesia to the resort zone is extremely rare. Furthermore, land access is limited to one road 
from Tanjung Pinang to the south. The road is narrow and some sections are in poor 
condition. Vehicles that reach the end of the road from Tanjung Pinang (approximately 1 
hour away) are confronted with barbed wire across the road way and a large security check 
post staffed by armed guards. If the resorts are quiet, local people are allowed to pass; 
however, if the resorts are busy, only individuals with recognised business within the resort 
zone (e.g. resort staff who live in the nearby town of Tanjung Uban) are permitted entry. 
Once inside the resort zone vehicles must then travel up to another 40 minutes before arriving 
at individual resorts. The gates to these resorts are often closed and always staffed by armed 
security guards. For local Bintan Island residents the resorts in Lagoi are ‘out-of-bounds’; the 
gates and security guards are clearly there to keep locals out. At the same time, while the 
gates effectively keep the tourists in, their symbolic value is much less apparent. The fences 
of the wider perimeter are not visible from the resort hotels that hug the northern coastline, 
and the nature of beach resort tourism is such that most tourists have little inclination to 
venture beyond their hotel pool or beach, even if transport were more readily available. 
The process of marking the resorts as a space ‘apart’ from the rest of Bintan Island extends 
beyond the physical enclosure of the land. Within the resort zone, the physical landscape, 
architecture, food and leisure activities have been chosen to reflect a pan-Asia–Pacific beach 
resort experience. Not only are the resorts stripped of their cultural referents to Bintan or 
Insular Riau, but in some cases to Indonesia as well. In the words of the Singaporean tourists 
who frequent the resorts, they could be ‘anywhere’ and perhaps even ‘in Singapore’. For 
residents of Tanjung Pinang, the ‘foreignness’ of Lagoi is heightened by the difficulties they 
face in finding employment within the resort zone. Jobs in the hotels are largely taken up by 
Indonesian migrant workers from Sumatra, Sulawesi, Java and Bali. Trained in the hospitality 
industry in other parts of Indonesia, many of these workers moved to Bintan in the wake of 
the Asian Financial Crisis and more recently the Bali bombings. Job recruiters for the resort 
zone often source their staff through hotel chains elsewhere, and without access to hotel and 
hospitality training facilities, local islanders have few opportunities to find employment. In 
this example, the flows of transnational capital and Indonesian labour further work to limit 
local islander opportunities and restricts not only physical movement but also socioeconomic 
mobility. The gates and fences that separate Lagoi and Lobam from the rest of the island are 
thus symbolic of the wider exclusion of Bintan Islanders from participation in the IMS-GT. 
While local people have been excluded from the luxury resort zone at Lagoi and the bonded 
manufacturing zone of Lobam, they have not been totally immune to the economic 
advantages of the IMS-GT. The main economic benefit of the growth triangle has been felt 
through a sharp rise in working-class tourism to Tanjung Pinang. Some of the visitors came 
to see family, to buy cheap goods or to visit places of which they had fond memories from 
trips to the islands in their youth. However, most working-class men came in search of sex, 
gambling, cheap alcohol and drugs. As Rizal, a 40-year-old civil servant, observed, the 
expansion of these ‘sin’ industries brought a boom in the local economy 
Many Singaporeans came here in the 1990s. They brought their dollars with them, 
which meant that local people could easily make a good living. The hotels were 
full, so hotel workers had plenty of income, as of course did the traders. Even the 
tukang ojek [motorcycle taxis] got their share working at the ports. People from 
other parts of Indonesia flooded here because they thought there’d be lots of 
opportunities. There were so many Singaporeans at that time! (Interview, July 
2005) 
But tourism, like many other aspects of Singaporean involvement in Tanjung Pinang, proved 
to be unreliable. Although the Riau Islands initially escaped the effects of the Asian Financial 
Crisis because of the buffer provided by the tourism industry, Tanjung Pinang’s honeymoon 
with Singaporean tourists did not last. The town’s reliance on the tourism industry further 
entrenched its marginal position with the IMS-GT and reinforced its inability to control the 
pace and direction of future economic and social development. The processes of enclosure 
that restricted Tanjung Pinang’s access to more sustainable and morally acceptable forms of 
development strengthened its attraction for the sex tourism industry. The physical barriers at 
Lagoi and Lobam quarantined the Indonesian workforce and Singaporean tourists alike from 
the vice industries elsewhere on the island, and the lack of access to alternative employment 
opportunities provided a ready-made workforce for sex tourism to thrive in Tanjung Pinang. 
Tanjung Pinang’s susceptibility to the vicissitudes of the IMS-GT became even more marked 
as Insular Riau’s relative prosperity became a magnet for people in other parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago. Tanjung Pinang (along with Batam) experienced a sudden influx of 
internal migrants. People flocked to Tanjung Pinang because, in Rizal’s words, ‘The crisis 
wasn’t as bad as it could have been, because we are close to other countries. You can always 
do something here. People come from elsewhere with just a handcart and they can make a 
living’ (Interview, July 2005). But the local economy could not absorb all the migrants. As 
the population increased, opportunities for employment were reduced. High internal 
migration, and the subsequent high levels of unemployment, threatened the very industry in 
which the migrants hoped to find work. Some local residents also blamed the sudden influx 
of internal migrants for driving the tourists away: 
Before Tanjung Pinang became really crowded, Singaporeans could come here 
and really enjoy themselves. Now there’s a lot of gangsterism (premanisme) in 
Tanjung Pinang so they don’t feel safe anymore. (Interview with Afrizal, July 
2005)24 
As Tanjung Pinang became absorbed into a cycle of more intense internal migration, 
residents saw their way of life changing and felt powerless to control the change. These new 
migrants are markedly different from earlier waves of migrants. Tanjung Pinang’s major 
migrant communities were well established by the 1970s (Sobary and Foulcher, 1987), and 
have become closely integrated into the Tanjung Pinang community. The people who came to 
Tanjung Pinang stayed, and most Tanjung Pinang-born children of migrants who arrived in 
the 1960s and 1970s speak Malay as their first language and consider themselves to be orang 
Tanjung Pinang (Tanjung Pinang people) first and foremost (see Ford, 2003).25 As the result 
of its long-standing status as an urban centre, and the relative cohesiveness of this 
community, Tanjung Pinang has far less of what Lindquist calls Batam’s ‘distinct frontier-
town atmosphere’ (Lindquist, 2002: 12).26 
Prior to the arrival of the recent migrants, few people in Tanjung Pinang called another place 
‘home’ or had a desire to be elsewhere for any more than a short period of time. The growth 
triangle, however, has challenged this sense of being. In contrast, new arrivals have not 
assimilated into Riau Islander life by adopting the Malay language and identifying with the 
Tanjung Pinang as their new ‘home’. They are focused on earning an income that they can 
remit money back to their families ‘somewhere else’. These new migrants have much more in 
common with their counterparts on Batam, which Lindquist notes, is a ‘kind of crossroads 
inhabited by migrants and tourists [where] most people call somewhere else “home”, even if 
they have never been there, and most have plans to go elsewhere’ (Lindquist, 2002: 41). 
Ironically, it is these processes of mobility that are most threatening to Tanjung Pinang’s way 
of life. The IMS-GT, instead of building and supporting a stronger sense of community 
through economic growth and social stability, has challenged means to be orang Kepri or 
orang Tanjung Pinang.27 
Conclusion  
It is clear, then, that the IMS-GT is not an ‘avatar of the “borderless” world’ (Sparke et al., 
2004: 486). However, neither does it, as Grundy-Warr et al. (1999: 325) suggest, truly 
represent a ‘form of economic integration without significant loss of national sovereignty’. 
Despite promises of economic integration under the IMS-GT, the Singapore–Insular Riau 
borderlands do not represent an abandonment of national boundaries: as Lindquist (2002: 18) 
indicates, it is inaccurate to describe the growth triangle as a ‘post-national arena’, because 
while Singaporeans, along with Singaporean capital, flow freely into Indonesian territory, the 
converse is far from true. The meanings and significance of the national border for a sense of 
local and national identity have been fluid in the decades since Indonesia gained its 
Independence. In the immediate post-Independence period, Riau Islanders’ way of life was 
little changed. Traders and families continued to move back and forth across the Straits to 
Malaya/Singapore. With Confrontation, the border became more tangible and its role in 
identifying and keeping the new national citizens of Singapore and Indonesia apart was made 
apparent for the first time. Restrictions on movement across the border, however, were short-
lived and the processes of enclosure that worked to keep the two communities separate were 
incomplete. Ultimately, it has been economic differences, rather than border controls, that 
have strengthened the barriers to cross-border movement. Contrary to the expectations of 
Tanjung Pinang residents interviewed, the IMS-GT, rather than breaking down these barriers 
and reinvigorating a history of regional trade, worked to further entrench their lack of 
physical and socioeconomic mobility. 
Although cross-border ties still exist and cross-border interactions still occur, the 
contemporary border between privileged Singapore (which has no real geographic periphery 
of its own) and the underprivileged hinterland of the Riau Islands embodies many more 
discontinuities than continuities. These discontinuities are evident when we compare the 
experiences of different communities within the Riau Islands. As a result of their different 
histories, communities in Batam and Bintan have little in common. Under the IMS-GT, 
despite the promise that Tanjung Pinang would become the site of economic development 
fuelled by a manufacturing zone and tourism development, residents continue to feel ‘left 
behind’ by the scale and pace of development on the nearby island of Batam. While both 
locations have become places of prostitution, drugs and gambling, even in these industries 
Tanjung Pinang is susceptible to economies of scale and the seemingly fickle nature of 
decision-making by Singapore’s working-class tourists. The processes of enclosure that work 
to restrict the movement of people from Tanjung Pinang into the enclosed spaces of Lagoi 
and Lobam also restrict their access to employment opportunities on Batam. The bordering 
practices that have come to define Tanjung Pinang’s experience of the IMS-GT and the 
Singaporean–Indonesian international border are replicated within the Riau Islands 
themselves. What people in both Bintan and Batam share, though, is a sense of ambivalence 
towards the IMS-GT and its implications for their lives. However, whereas for Batam 
Islanders that ambivalence is part of what Lindquist (2002: 31) describes as the ‘anxieties of 
mobility’ (a direct response to their continued identity as temporary migrants), in Tanjung 
Pinang, a stronger sense of home and belonging has prompted a different set of concerns for 
the future of their community. 
The more established nature of the community in Tanjung Pinang has impacted on the ways 
in which local people have responded to the IMS-GT project. As our paper has shown, for 
Island-born and long-term residents of Tanjung Pinang, the IMS-GT promised economic and 
social development by building on a history of mobility between the Riau Islands, the island 
state of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. Unlike Batam, which has a large transient 
population whose expectations of mobility are framed by the expectations of ‘going home’, 
people in Tanjung Pinang have a historical expectation of mobility between the islands and 
across the relatively new international border. Contemporary realities of heightened global 
security concerns and nationally oriented economic growth policies have worked to restrict 
this movement – whether through stricter cross-border immigration controls or through the 
financial inability to travel. The processes of enclosure extend beyond the geopolitical border 
that separates Indonesian from Singapore. People in Tanjung Pinang increasingly find their 
physical and socioeconomic mobility, as well as their identity and way of life, constrained by 
the realities of the IMS-GT. Security fences, arbitrary controls on migration flows, the lack of 
employment and educational opportunities for locals, a reliance on the whims and fancies of 
Singaporean tourists for daily survival, and dependence on decision-making by Jakarta- and 
Batam-based officials without a vested interest in Tanjung Pinang, all work to restrict the 
movement of Bintan Islanders. Despite the promises of the IMS-GT, for the orang Tanjung 
Pinang life under the growth triangle is more about enclosure than it is about mobility. 
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local people’s experiences of the IMS-GT are different yet again. 
3 The study is based on semistructured in-depth interviews conducted in Tanjung Pinang in 2002, 2004 and 
2005. We would like to acknowledge Hambali for his assistance with 20 in-depth fieldwork interviews in July 
2005. Respondents were selected on the basis of their length of stay in Tanjung Pinang (all respondents were 
Tanjung Pinang-born or long-term residents) and on the basis of class (the group was divided more or less 
equally into middle-class and working-class respondents). An attempt was made to achieve gender balance; 
however, approximately three-quarters of all respondents were male. On the importance of narratives in the 
study of borderlands, see also Sidaway (2002). 
4 While our usage of the term ‘enclosure’ clearly draws on the Marx’s theory of accumulation by dispossession 
(made evident in the enclosure movements of Great Britain) and more recent struggles over displacement and 
privatisation (see Hart, 2004), in this paper we use it to refer specifically to those political, social and cultural 
processes that restrict access to movement across borders. Some indigenous Malays and the Orang Laut 
(nomadic fisher people) have certainly been dispossessed of their land and waterways as a result of the IMS-GT, 
and ongoing land claims continue to be pursued by small groups of former landholders in both Batam and 
Bintan. These struggles, however, remain outside the scope of this paper. The significant role of the Batamindo 
Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) and the central Indonesian government in development planning in 
the islands also gives rise to important questions about the intersection between state and private interests. This 
issue too is outside the scope of this paper, but is an integral part of our wider study (see Note 1). 
5 Zaman Dollar (The Era of the Dollar) is a term often used in Tanjung Pinang to refer to the period before 
Confrontation (the military confrontation and associated low-level skirmishes between Indonesia and the Malay 
Federation that took place in 1963). 
6 For a detailed history of the concept of ‘Riau’, see Wee (1985). 
7 For discussions of some of the broader issues concerning borderlands in South-East Asia see Grundy-Warr and 
Wong (2002) and Horstmann (2004). 
8 In their critique of the IMS-GT, Grundy-Warr et al. (1999: 321) argue that Singapore and Insular Riau ‘lack . . 
. any deep pre-existing local-level linkages’. Our research suggests that while this observation may be accurate 
for many Singaporeans, it does not hold true for residents of Tanjung Pinang. 
9 Wee’s respondents also reported that they had far better access to imported goods than the rest of Indonesia at 
this time. According to Lindquist (2002), Riau Islanders probably also consumed sexual services in Singapore. 
10 Kepri is a widely used abbreviation for ‘Kepulauan Riau’. It is commonly used to describe the islands, and 
now the province bearing the same name. 
11 For accounts of Confrontation and its effects in Insular Riau, see Wee (1985) and Lindquist (2002). 
12 Our respondents indicated that during this time they identified more strongly with Singapore than they did 
with either the Sumatran mainland, or Jakarta many thousands of kilometres away. The use of the Singapore 
dollar for everyday trading and the continued culture of smuggling meant that in contrast to most Indonesian 
rural communities at that time, many residents of Tanjung Pinang had access to television sets (watching 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Singapore channels) and a range of electronic goods. They told us that the life they saw on Singaporean 
television was not that different from their own. 
13 For details of major IMS-GT projects, see Peachey et al. (1998) and Pereira (2004). 
14 Abdullah here refers to the Singapore dollar. In other parts of Indonesia, the economy is not sensitive to the 
Singapore dollar but rather to the US dollar 
15 Indonesians living in areas included in growth triangles do not have to pay the hefty exit tax (fiskal) imposed 
by the Indonesian government on its citizens. 
16 In an effort to educate local Singaporeans about the dangers posed by these ‘illegals’, the main English daily, 
The Straits Times, also ran extensive coverage on illegal entrants to Singapore. Local Singaporeans were warned 
about the dangers of large numbers of unskilled Indonesian migrants entering Singapore and were urged to be 
vigilant in order to protect the island city (Miller and Singh, 1998). They were told that as a nation, 
Singaporeans had to ‘grow calluses on their heart’ when confronted with the plight of Indonesia’s poor. 
17 The people we spoke to constantly referred to the fact that life is very different in Singapore, both 
economically and socially. In the words of Abdullah, ‘Singaporeans are amazing. From the perspective of their 
economic structure, their social status, their lives are far more stable and prosperous than Indonesians, especially 
people living in Tanjung Pinang’ (Interview, July 2005). 
18 Movement across the border from Singapore has also been affected by recent events. The economic downturn 
in Singapore has reduced the spending power of the working class and caused a decline in some segments of the 
tourism industry. The Bali bombings have served as a local reference point for concerns about Islamic terrorism 
in the region and the safety of Singaporeans travelling in an increasingly unruly Indonesia. In one article soon 
after the bombing, a Singaporean was reported as saying: ‘I was extremely shocked. It really rattles one because 
Bali is only three-four hours away. What’s next? Bintan?’ (The Straits Times, 2002). The arrest of Mas Selamat, 
leader of the Singapore branch of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network, in Tanjung Pinang in early 2003 brought 
these fears close to home. In a more recent letter to the Forum pages of The Straits Times, a Singaporean likened 
the situation of Singaporeans travelling to the Riau Islands to Australians travelling to Bali: ‘Singapore can be 
made into a fortress but Bintan may be the soft target. I do not wish to sound like an alarmist but something 
must be done before it is too late’ (Prasad, 2004). 
19 This romanticisation of the past was a common theme in our discussions with residents of all ages. See Wee 
(1985) for a discussion of the problems associated with this characterisation of shared identity. 
20 Our research with Singaporeans also reinforces this view. Singaporean Malays told us that they saw 
themselves as qualitatively different from Riau Islanders, despite shared language, religion and culture. 
21 There was considerable debate about whether the provincial capital should be in Tanjung Pinang or Batam. 
22 ‘Local hires’ are offered lower wages than workers recruited from other parts of Indonesia, and are often the 
first to be retrenched when there is a downturn in production. 
23 An earlier term used to denote the IMS-GT based on the first two letters of each regional partner (SIngapore– 
JOhor–RIau). It is in much more common usage in Riau than in Singapore. 
24 It is widely believed by local residents that Singaporeans now prefer to go to Batam or Tanjung Balai rather 
than to Tanjung Pinang because of the rise in pickpocketing and other crimes. Some locals also saw the drop in 
tourists as a reflection of Singaporeans’ greater access to mobility within the IMS-GT. Ali said: ‘We used to be 
the favourites. Tourists always wanted to come here, especially for sex. Sex was easy to get, and we had all the 
facilities: good cheap hotels, and all the rest. But then we started to have problems, and tourists didn’t want to 
come here anymore. Now they all want to go to Tanjung Balai because they feel comfortable there. They can get 
off the ferry and do what they need to do without getting hassled all the time’ (Interview, December 2004). In 
contrast, Rizal – perhaps because of his own very direct family connections to Singapore – understands this as 
the product of an economic problem within Singapore itself: ‘After the crisis hit, the numbers of Singaporeans 
coming here dropped. Now the hotels are quiet, and the money has dried up. The numbers of Singaporeans who 
come here are much lower than in the 1990s. Maybe it’s because their economy was also affected [by the 
Crisis], so where before they had plenty of time to go places, to contact friends, maybe now they have to spend 
their time working’ (Interview, July 2005). 
25 Wee (1985, 2002) predicates ‘localness’ in the islands on being Malay; however, Malays are not the only 
groups who make claims to place in Tanjung Pinang. 
26 On the historical importance of frontiers, see, for example, Gray (2001). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
27 Literally: A person from Riau or a person from Tanjung Pinang. 
